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I  should 1  ike to· make  a  fe'W  remarks about  ho'l-7  lie  in tl:e ·  . 
Commission of the European  Communities  see the problem  of  .. 
COmpetition in car00 liner shipping frO!:':  certain state--tr;:,r._:i.,1g 
countries,  in particular the Soviet Union. 
The  Soviet Union's merchru-lt  shippin~ fleet has been  ex;:-::.'1.-li~ 
rapidly since the early 1970s.  The  Soviets now  ha•,·e  :Che  ci::Ut 
la.r,:-;est  merchant  fleet in the world.  The  emphasis )ieG cJ.e;:):'ty 
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. . an general  cargo. ships,  wtiere  the. Soviet  Union  has  been 
'  ' 
number  one  since  1974.  _Half  _its fleet  consists  of  genera_:l 
carga  ships.·~he Soviet  Union  itself generates  only  about 
. 1.6 "·of international  seab~rne trade in general  cargo,  but it 
has  a  carrying  capacity of  flve  and  .a  half  t~mes as  much,. 
Thu~ ~ussiari  competiti~n has  ~ad~ itself most  felt  in  the 
'  . 
liner trades.  In· _a  period  of  only, .five  years,  fro.m  1970 
to  1975~_the USSR  doubled  ita deep  sea  liner carryings 
from.  4 -million  to  over-8 million  tons.  In  comparison, 
·.  wo~ld  seaborn~  tr~d• gr~w'b~·only· ab~ut ~n~ third during 
· that period.  ..' 
.... '  .. - -
.-The  Seviet· fleet  expansion  wave  shows' no  signs  of 
abating  yet~  According  to  Russian  sources it is plenned 
to  add,  durin~g  the  current five  year  pl~n  -~hie~  ~lll  be 
completed  in  .1980,  'one  million_ deadw~ight ton's  per year to 
.  •. 
the merchant fleet.  Most  of this tonnage _wi~l be highly 
.  '. 
apecialiaed roll-on rol!-off,  Lash·and  container  vessels. 
I  .  .  . 
The<Be  ships  are  clearly designed  to  capture  a  . ·  · l,  .  ..  .  . 
signific~nt sbara  of  the  lucrative  western· transport 
t  :  .  . 
mark'et_s,  since  the  nat~;~re  of  Russi_an  exports  and  imports 
does  not ~equi~e such  sophisticated  transport  tech~ology  • 
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·.The  rajiid  gro~th ·of. the Russian fleet  and  of its carryings 
'  I  o  :..  •  0  0  • 
·_m~ana that  somebody  has  to  give  way  to  allow  the  Russians 
.  ' 
a-larger slice of the _cake.  The  statistics show  . 
.  clearl~y  ~hat U?_,.  EEC  ·and  J~panes~  shi~p~:ng  companies 
. have  suffered  most  frum  Russian  competition.  In  the  bila-
te~al lioer.trades  b~tween western  and  state-tradi~g 
countries,  Russia· ~nd its CbMECON  partners  have  managed 
to~ establish virtual -monopolies.  The~e they  control  up 
.·to  95%  ~f  th~ market.  In  the  cross-trades  wit~ third 
countries. their  competition· methods  are  hitting 'the 
established liner conferences  hard.- For  instance,  ! t  is 
estimated  that  in  ttle  North  Atlantic  trades  C 1:.!:1':~ol"! 
,-r •. 
ohips,  ooerating  outsi-de  the  liner conferences;  already 
carry· 18  % e~stbound. and.  22  ~ westbound  of  the  traffic 
volume  carried  by  the  conferences.  It is also  estimated 
'  .  -
.that  COMECON  liners  ha~e captured-about  35%  of  the 
comparabl~ conference  ·c~rgo  transpo~ted between  ~orthern 
.  .  - . 
Europe  and  the  Mediterranean,  25%  betweenANorthern  Europe 
and  th~ We~t  Coas~ of South  America,  over  20  % bet~2en 
Gulf  of  M~xi~o ports  and.the Mediterranean,  about. 
.  . 
20  ~;  in the Europe-East. Africa traffic 2.:1r112  ~~  bet-vreen  ...  h:)J·~  :·.:·1d  tha 
t·lest  Coast  ~f the Uni tocl  St~tes. Add  to this that the T;·,:mssi·:J::rirm 
. Raiiuay .si~hons off  abo~t ·15  7~  of the  .E::..s!~  Asia-EUrope  traff::..c •. Hh2.t 
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  . 
in~::es the situation  ~ve:n worse is that Soviet veosels are  ort~~~:  a·ble 
I  •  •  '  •  •  ...  .  .  ..  .  ,  - '  . 
to  skim off the cream of hieh-rated  t~affic and leave -vrestern 
.,  cocipru1ies with the  scraps  • 
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:.or co;m-se,  port traffic fie,"'Ul'es. also reflect this· trend;  l3rcl:lCn  C..."li 
Hambur.r;  are preminent bases for Soviet and other Comecon  ship.O!)eratcrs'  ho9e 
.  ~ 
.and  cross-tr~des. German  North Sea ports,  for instence,  re~istered·~l inc~ease. 
of traffic by  Comec~n liner operators. of 74 %  in the period 1970 - 1974. 
In terms<of total to~age Comeco~ operators offered in 1976 ab.out  ,3'.1  million 
net  ref:P.st~r tons in Bremen  ~d  5.~ mill:i,on net·  regis~er tons in Ham butt:• 
.  . 
And it  me:y  be t.hat this 'is only the tip of  the  i.ceb~rg;- the penetrationt.of 
i 
i 
I; 
.  I 
. our tra<ies by Comecon.  operatore could eve? quicken in pace in the·  yea.rcvto_<2_ome~ 
....... , ...  ·" 
· ... 
'  ·, 
. .  .  ;  ~··Faced Mith  .~his situation we  are tempted to ask:  First, . what· 
· motivatdd 1-the  Soviet Union to step up  ~ts activities in merchant  shipping 
so  significant~? ·Second,  what  makes it so successful?  And  finally, 
.  ~ 
·why should we  be concerned ·about  i1;?  I  don't thitlk that the first 
I 
. J 
question: can si.:mplv'  be  ~swered with a  statement like they l-rant  .to .:;1cke  monc:r,  :~ 
· ·  just like,_evecybody else.  ·Certainly,  they also want  to make  money  htt  ·  .:.o'! 
: this objectiv~ !leed~ to.  be seen against  the.  ba~k~und of the overall  c~onomic~f 
·.  and other pol1c.y  obJeC~lves of the state. Th1s  l.s  what  makes  a  Sov1et  sh1ppw£.~ ~.1 
.. ,  company  so diff'.er,ent -~rom a  w~s~_ern. one~ like ·all other economic  _aot.iv~ties,  ~-~ 
the merchant marine !s an instrument of the state ·ror achieving itn political  ! 
'  -, 
and,overall economic objectives,  t1hereas  a ·western company  in fulfillir:g 
. .  .  . 
. its transport  f'11nctions  wants,  in competition with others,  to  \..rork  an 
profitably as possible· in a  priv~t.e 'ent~rprise system.·  Undoubtedly,  the 
.  ..- .  '  . 
·USSR  merchant. Jmarine  fulfils the role of a  reserve fleet for military 
.transport purpo.ses.  Th_is 'became  clear during the Cuba ·crisis,  durin[: the 
Vietnam war and again during the Aneola ~ar.  1-1any  of the  ··merchant· ~hi;:>s 
are equipped with electronic and other sophisticated. gear,  far in  excess  . .  / 
r 
I 
t 
I 
of normal  commercial  requirements.  Navai officers a."ld  crew are kno~m to  . l 
serve also  it). "tlle  merchant  marine. and crews  are ·largely interclianeco.ble• 
.. 
I  will not  .say core now  about  th~ strategicaspect of this question,  ni!:ce 
·it is noi;  a  matter for the Eu;opean ·co:cinission: But  it clearly needs 
' to 'be  ta..~~n in-to accoUnt  in any overall  assess~ent of the situation  • 
.  . 
·  Anoth~ reason for the ·.s(>viet  merchant ·~arine build-up l-ms  the  .  .  .  . 
realisation in 'the sixties that -the· USSR  depended too much  on  non-CC.!.ECOI~  .  .  .  .  '  '  .  . 
shipping services. for its exports and_ imports._  This was  coupled with  an 
awareness that a  grea.~·er economic link.,;.up ·was  nee~ed with western 
'  . i 
industrialised countries in order to achieve the ambitious economic  objectives· ~i 
II 
laid down·  in  t~e long-term development  plans.  So  the Soviet  m7rch~!rt · narinc 
had and still has to fulfil·the double  economic  function  t;f'  ir;;port ·  .. 
substitution.- aiming at ·the trannport  in RuSsian or cor.mcc-:-;  ships of a  mq;j~ 
share of thecna'tior.al foreien trade - and of export diversification  thro~h 
.. the export :O'f ::Shipping. services.  In  Eastern Europe they cnll  it the 
'i 
;i 
... J 
'  ~·  j  ,, 
"  .  '  >I 
;  ~  ..... 
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ft-o~i:-Dl  r.-ex~r"'~jective::,of th.ei~ merchant :•marine'  and it .i.!J  • ie~to:han  ~the  •  '; J' 
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·;~-~·  : 
.  ·' 
.. 
'. 
I. 
.s 
·primary' .economic motive of the. current  phase of. fleet· expansion. 
,  , .  After all_,  Soviet' for~.ign trade must .expand  in order to pny 
for the rapidly growing imports of 1·1estern techllology.  As  yoil  knew,  a 
large ,proportion of. Soviet  exports consists of raw materials,  the productio1:  '  .. 
·~:· 
of which ·is  ~not ·easily  incre~s_ed and. which are particularly  ~ensitive  •' 
to the ups and  down~ of the business cycle in Wes~ern countries.  Therefore, 
.  .  .  . 
the obvious answer is ari  incr~ase of  finishe~ products and services  in 
order to increase earnings of·  h~rd' currencies.  l~ile in· the  finis~ed 
'  •  •l  . 
product~ sector the  Russi~s hav~ not  been particularly successful  due 
.,  to problems about  meeting western demand· and product quality standards; 
.  ' 
they· have been singularly successful ·in the  provisi~n ~f shipping 
services.  It is difficult to quantify the foreign  exch~~ge  inco~~ of the 
Soviet. fleet,  since tio  official USSR  ~tatistics are available on this· 
subject; but 'western shipping  circi~s estimate· soyi~t' roreit;n·· cxc::nnge 
income  from  shippil)g at about  600  million dollars ,in  1976.  This is a 
sicnificant  con~~ribution to the.ir balance .of  payrnents. 
What,  then,  makes  the Soviets so  successful  in-merchant  Ehip!)ing? 
Well,  for one thing the Soviets •lmow  · ho\..z  to exploit r!estern  ecor:.o::1ic 
freedoms for  ~heir own  ends while denying reciprocal rights to our 
Western companies •. ~oreover, Western shipping consists of hundreds of 
. individual, .independant  companies,  ali competing uith  ~~ch other ar.d 
facing on the other side one huge state-supp()rted  organi~ation. Thun, 
while a  uestern company  must  be profitable in order to meet its 
. current and replacement  costs,  .. a  Russian shd.pping  company-doesn't 
have  such worries.  A large share. of  the costs  ~Ihich a  western  co:~pany 
must  absorb itself, are covered by the  sta~e  •  .And  thanks to the a18ence 
of hard-barga.j.nine labour .unions,· Russian se2Jllen  are reported to  e:.r-:1 
only about  i20 dollars a  month,  while  a  Hestern seaman  ma.'k::e.s·  five  times 
that.much. 
. . 
In  these  circumstances  it would  be  naive  to expect  that  somehow  our  open  . 
western  economic  system  would  Let  the more  efficient  companies  survive.  On 
the  contrary,  the  winner  in this economic  game  is  liable to be  already determined 
before the match  has  started.  The  tactics used  to ensure dominance  of their 
national  trades  by  state-trading countries and  the desired  penet~ation of 
~ 
.  ·~ 
' 
•  western  cross-trades are  simple  but  in their own  term  highly effective. 
In  their national  trades  there  is  close  coordination  between  the  state export/ 
import  monopolies  and  the state shipping  companies.  Priority is given to 
shipping  Russian  foreign  trade  in  Russian  ships.  Second  in  line •  ' .  . 
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are the COMECOU  par:tners and last the other eomp~ies_  •.  All this is 
coordinated by a  central freighting bureau  with headquarters in 1-:oscow • 
With  developing countries the Russians like to conclude bilateral agree1:1ents 
. based on ·50  a  50  cargo  sharing proyisions.  A  subtler method  is used .in· 
.- ,  I 
trades with western  countries~ · there the Russians buy FOB  and sell CIFj 
.  .  -
~which gives them complete dominance  over the.transport  part of the 
·  transaction.  In the economically more  important and profitable cross-trades, 
.  ..  .  .  .  .  I.  .  ·:..  .  . 
.  - of course,  these methodl:l  1-:ould  not work.  Additionally,  entry into those 
.·:,markets  is: more  .. difficult bec::ause  a  good  deal of them are  served..--~:-l liner  .- .  ·  con  .. c  .. enccs 
· .  conferences.  This is 1no  problem in the relatively loosely-~~it/operating 
_···
1
to and from the U~ited.States, but  in other pcUots  of the world it :nay  not . 
. ·be easy to gain,  as a  'p.ewcorner~  rights to become  a  conference men":er  and  to 
' 
. participate i.il  fts traffic.  T:he·  Russian solution to the problem is a  classic· 
.  .  .  .  .  .  '  .  .  ~  . 
capit~list one  •.  They first operate outs;de the conference  syste~, 
heavily Undercutting conference rates and aiso _the. rates of oiher •::estern 
ou~siders, ln _order ::.to  gain .a share of the market.  The undercu.ttir.e  can 
,be general o:r  selective depending·on the.trade  involved.  In particular 
· casea  ~ssian qu~tations are up to ·so%  below  co~p~rable ~:restcrri  f~Gight 
·. ·rates, on the ·average they are  a~out 15  ~o 2~  belol-1.  I  mentioned already 
. that they also like to skim off the high-paying cargos and leave  the rest 
to the conferences.·· Qnce a  firm  pos~tion is es.tablished in a  specific trade, 
conferences are accepted as a  price-leader -..;hich ·Russian:• shippins cor:.panies 
follo~1  clos~ly by maintaining· a  certain percentage differential..  Since 
·soviet  shippi~g ~ompanies can easily match'all possible commercial  · 
defence measures of the liner CO}'lferences  simply by quoting even lo~.;er 
_ tariffs~  ~t ·is evident that _w~~tern shipping companies  can hardly fignt. 
back at coii!Inercial  level.  In some 'trades,  such as the Eu.rope-Eaot  Africn.11 
or Europe-North American trades, _the  RUssians  ~e  not only a  threat. to the 
. ''  . conference system but they are also  slowly eroding the economic health of our 
shippipg companies •.  The  S_ituation is bound.  to become  Horse once all the . 
spec~alised tonnage now  being built  i~· seCking. employment  in the international' 
.  .  .  - '  ·.  '  . 
trades.  ·-
Port 8.dminietrn:tions need to reflect also about  their nm·t 
Soviet and  other Comecon  clients,· since as  a.  rule these do not  ~e11g:-~te 
additioncil traffic for the ports but  simply  ~arry traffic that  oth·?~'Hise 
would  have boon. carried by western shippinc companies. ·or  <-ourso 1  no"oorly 
·is drccmin,:;  of banninc- Comecon  country fl  a_ss  !'rom  our ports,  b11 t  I  tt1i  n~;: 
it is  hi~~h  tim~ thn.t  we  otnr·tcd a!31dnc  ourncl  veo l-:here  the li:1it.  ~~  t:o 
.I 
I 
t 
t 
1 
!  their p;::trti.ei,.-tJ.-tioh  in our vitfll oeaborne  tr~le ch(J1.lld .bo  drn\nc. 
' 
'".  I ,  I 
- 7 
From the point of view of the western shipper - as opposed 
to shipowner - it could,  9f course, be arcued that competition help:5 
keep freiGht rates down. ancl  provides the shipper lii  th a  genuine al  t'3r-
.  I.  .  . 
..  native oeans of transport.  The  phenomenal  success. of the Russians  shows 
that many  shippers  ~ust take that atti_tude,  at least in the short  terr.1. 
But· shippers  ar~ clearly as concerned as  shipol'mers .abo_ut  the lone term 
implico.tions  ~f Russian comp.eti tion. This was  der.1onstra:ted  durin[~· a 
· joint conference  ~~European shippers'. o~~cils,~d shipotinero held 
in Switzerland last year,  when  a  joint declaration \·1as  iscuecl wa.rning 
that continued Comecon  penetration of western trades could result  in the 
long run in destruction of the  conferenc~ system,.  serious deterior:?..tion 
in the quality of\.shippin~ servi?es,  and restriction of freedom  of choice 
among alternative shipping services. 
This is already part of the ansuer to. the third quection I 
posed at the ~eeinn~ne·: why  should we  be concerned  about  this build 
·~ .  '. 
up of Russia.'l shippine 'competition ?  There are other reasons too. 
Obviously the huge Soviet merchant fleet can become  a  security ris!:  - .  . 
· fo~. the l'!est  i..'l  times of instability anywhere  in the vrorld.  Par£!.-
.  .  . 
doxically, this fleet is nourishQd by our  otm  international trade. 
· J.toreover,  an ever-grovling Russian fleet which is completely removec.' 
from  our influence tnreatens the  economic health of  our  shippinc-
companies c.nd  can make  international  seaborne trade more'  and  mo.re 
· depenrlent  on non-western shipping services. This l'rould  brint; us  int·) 
undesirable economic dependency and would  ma.l:e  us very vulnerable  -to 
. econor:tic pressures  .•. 
In spite of these dangers the  countries of the Europea..'1 
Economic Community have 'still .to-define and  a{;ree  on a  coordinated 
. and coherent set of objectives against which to  judGe where  action 
may  be·necessary in the face of Soviet and other· Comecon  count~y 
participation in our international trade. There has _been  a  tendcnc;r 
·to. think that 'these  countries·would somehow  behave accordinc to our 
rules of the game  if only we  held on to them tenaciously.  But· I  . 
think 1t l'lill be necessary for us to establish vis-a-vis the  sto:.te-· 
. trad.inc countries a  new  set of ruleo of the came  trudne into account 
their econor.lic  system and not  i~orinc it. 
r 
i 
I 
; 
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First step_s. have  already been taken.  Some  of the Member 
States.of the Community  m~st _hit by Soviet competition have.tried to 
negotia~e satisfactory arrangements bilaterally. This approach is 
' ·  still be:lnc;  pursued1  but experience  so far has been disappointinr;  • 
. !.  This is-not very  ~urpri.sing, because the Russians. suspect that a 
. ·  singie- country would· have  diffi~ul  ty. in implementing unilateral 
defensi~e measures for fear of  l~~ine ~rade and traffic to  it~ 
.  . 
.  nei~hbours. This is no doubt the· basic reason why  the counter-
measures pot-rers  which exist in almost  every_ lh~mber State of the 
.  .  .  . 
Community  ha~e never yet been applied to them.  Of  course,  the 
Russians are aware of this weakness_  of. European cotmtri'es. 
'  . 
l.Unistcrs from  Community  countries have returned from visits 
. to l1oscov1  with the clear impression that the Russians believe_ the 
West  lacks the resolve to· apply sanctions in·:its O\-m  defence • 
· Faced with this situation,  the Council' of !>1inisters 
... 
of the Community  hae{ decided that a  serious examination must  ·now  be 
.  .  . 
made  of the scope for  taki~~ action  no~ only at national but also 
at European Community  level·,  and· ~n association,. \·rhere  possible,. 
with other like-minded couritries  •. ,In response to a  request by the 
:Council  of l'.inisters the Commission's  services prepared last autumn 
a  working paper on  shrppi~g competition by East European  stat·e-tracin~ 
countries,  l'thich analyzed· the situation and ito implications and 
revieued al  tcrnatives for  common  action at Cornrnuni ty level,  ra."lcine: 
from the  establishm~nt of GUidelines applicable to Community-State. 
tradinc country shippine relationships to  th~ coordin..'ltion of l-!e::1ber 
States'- counter-measure  povrers  and thP.  appl icat  5.on  of quota 
restric·tions in specific trades,  should the t1lidelines not be 
·observed.  .. 
_  ... ,. 
The  Council  of Ministers has already· reacted favourably 
to the Commission's services'  report and asked it to present to the 
·Council  concrete ·proposals for action by eprine; 1978.  At  present  He 
are rrorkine on these in close co11certation uith our Member  States. 
The  subject is very complex  since. not only transport aspects  pla:r a, 
rOle but also a  careful  evaluation of the overall  trade and  forei:-:n 
'  - ~-
policy aspects is required before  a  decision on  the  scope  21d  nat~re  , 
of defensive action can be made.  I  want  to emphnsize  that neither 
l ' 
, .  . 
9 
the Comiaeion nor the Member  States want  to provoke a  co'nfrona:tion 
with the Soviet Union  or its ffi!llow  Comecon  membero~ nor do we  \·tent 
to exclude. them  from  our trades. All  we  want  is to put  our defenceo 
in ·order  ~d to _coordinate -them while otill expecting that ne{:.·otia-
tions \'Till  ul  tir:iately lead Jo a solution of our  problem~. But  we 
want  to negotiate from  a._p~sition of strenorrth,  and in establishinc 
. _this positi?n it seems to me 'that the. Community  has an important 
part to play. 
. '.-
'  . 
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